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# Leadership and Command on the Battlefield


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Noncommissioned Officer Corps



Department of the Army  
Headquarters  
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

1994



Information collected and assembled by

**CSM Robert E. Wilson**

Headquarters, United States Army Sergeants Major Academy  
Fort Bliss, Texas

Edited by

**Dr. Susan Canedy**

Office of the Command Historian

Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

Graphic Design by

**Mrs. Linda Christensen**

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management

Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

Special thanks for assistance with format and organization of  
information to

**Dr. Roger Spiller**

George C. Marshall Professor of Military History

United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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### Commander's Intent..

Capture the successful techniques of battlefield commanders and their command sergeants major at corps, division, brigade and selected battalion levels. Specifically, investigate how they used their senior noncommissioned officers in the preparation for combat, during combat, and post combat operations. Identify commonalities of leadership principles, techniques and procedures used at these levels of command during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

Through the use of surveys and the interview process, discover the areas that contributed to the success of the command sergeants major, the sergeants major, and the first sergeants. Question each commander and command sergeant major on the impact their senior NCOs had on the mission.

The findings of this interview process will be categorized for historical and doctrinal purposes, published and distributed to the field in pamphlet format. Show how success in combat operations is directly related to utilization of senior noncommissioned officers.

*Fredrick M. Franks Jr.*  
FREDERICK M. FRANKS, JR.  
General, USA  
Commanding

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## Table of Contents

|                     |  |            |
|---------------------|--|------------|
| <b>Introduction</b> | .....                                  | <b>vii</b> |
| <b>Chapter 1.</b>   | <b>Preparation for Combat</b> .....    | <b>1</b>   |
|                     | The Command Team .....                 | 2          |
|                     | Training Assessment .....              | 4          |
|                     | Predeployment Planning .....           | 6          |
|                     | Leaders' Observations .....            | 10         |
| <b>Chapter 2.</b>   | <b>Combat Operations</b> .....         | <b>11</b>  |
|                     | Combat Roles .....                     | 12         |
|                     | Command Confidence .....               | 13         |
|                     | Combat Position .....                  | 14         |
|                     | Leaders' Observations .....            | 18         |
| <b>Chapter 3.</b>   | <b>Post Combat Operations</b> .....    | <b>19</b>  |
|                     | Mission Adjustment .....               | 20         |
|                     | Sustainment .....                      | 22         |
|                     | Leaders' Observations .....            | 24         |
| <b>Chapter 4.</b>   | <b>Sustaining Success</b> .....        | <b>25</b>  |
|                     | Discipline Standards .....             | 26         |
|                     | Training .....                         | 28         |
|                     | Leader Development .....               | 30         |
|                     | Leaders' Observations .....            | 32         |
| <b>Summary</b>      | .....                                  | <b>33</b>  |
| <b>Appendix A.</b>  | <b>Bullet Comments of Trends</b> ..... | <b>37</b>  |
| <b>Appendix B.</b>  | <b>Survey Questions</b> .....          | <b>39</b>  |
| <b>Appendix C.</b>  | <b>Leaders Acknowledgment</b> .....    | <b>43</b>  |

## **Introduction**

***This battlefield, as every other battlefield for this American Army, validated the wisdom of the noncommissioned officer corps and the often repeated comment, "NCOs are the backbone of the Army."***

**LTG Frederick M. Franks, Jr.  
Cdr, VII Corps  
DESERT STORM**

This pamphlet is the fourth in a series undertaken in an effort to capture the battle command successes of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. The first pamphlet focused on commonalities and trends of successful battlefield commanders at brigade, division, and corps. The second pamphlet examined the same issues from the viewpoint of battalion and company commanders. This pamphlet focuses on how senior NCOs functioned in these operations, the relationships they shared with their commanders, and trends of success at battalion, brigade, and division levels.

The Army proved through JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM that it is a force of well trained, highly disciplined soldiers. It is an Army fully capable of using modern weapons systems. The Army has successfully integrated detailed doctrine, officer and NCO leadership, and motivated soldiers to defeat the enemy on the battlefield.

This pamphlet, for historical purposes, seeks to determine the role of senior NCOs in pre-combat, combat, and post-combat situations. To meet this task, the words and interviews of commanders and NCOs are used to tell how doctrine and principles were transformed into the training standards and battle drills of success. There is no attempt in this booklet to establish doctrine or policy. Rather, it is an attempt to capture how senior NCOs performed their tasks and responsibilities in combat operations.


All commanders and NCOs were asked the same questions, centered on their experiences in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Each question focused on their individual experiences and their opinion about senior NCOs in both operations. The questions asked are presented in Appendix B.

The Army is changing its focus to a CONUS-based force capable of global power projection. It is essential to keep the fighting edge and technical expertise of soldiers within this changing Army, and that rests on a strong corps of noncommissioned officers. The insights shared in this pamphlet outline several key elements of success which will never change—training to standards and leader development. The challenge to the noncommissioned officer corps is to combine the insights presented here with experience, to step out in front of the soldiers, and lead them to victory in the United States Army of the future.

## Chapter 1

# Preparation for Combat

*I trusted my NCOs and I had confidence in their ability to take care of me during combat. Also, I was trained well by my sergeant—if something had happened to him, I was prepared to step forward into his position.*



Unidentified soldier  
1st Infantry Division  
DESERT STORM

In the summer of 1990, General Frederick M. Franks, then Commander of the 1st Infantry Division, reflected on the soldiers' trust in NCOs as a key to the Army's performance. "Almost every soldier told me two important things," Franks said, "they all stated that their training was critical in preparing them for the unknowns of combat, and they praised the sergeants who had ensured they were ready for battle. This is a reflection of the competence and abilities of the NCOs the soldier sees; not just those in the soldier's immediate chain of command, but those who make up the NCO structure in a unit."

Thus goes the story of success for the NCO Corps in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Soldiers continually stressed the importance of preparation for deployment and combat.



Additionally, they felt it was important for soldiers to see their first sergeants and command sergeants major up front, enduring the rigors and hazards. When soldiers passed out credit for combat success, it went to realistic training, predeployment checks, battle drills, and careful attention of NCOs ensuring each soldier's family was cared for prior to development.


FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, states, "The proper execution of training to standard is a difficult but rewarding process. It places a significant burden on the trainer in terms of preparation and assessment of performance. The payoff for properly executed training is a unit trained to standard on its wartime mission." The command sergeant major and first sergeant were key players in the assessment process and helped in preparing soldiers for deployment and ultimately combat operations. Senior NCOs were responsible for all the small unit and individual training skills which led to the confident and competent soldiers of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. This chapter focuses on the role of the senior NCO in the preparation for combat.

### **THE COMMAND TEAM**

In previous pamphlets, battalion and company commanders asserted that teamwork and cohesion within their unit, with other units, and with other services played a major role in the success of Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. That teamwork and cohesion was normally characteristic of the relationships between commanders and their senior NCOs.

Throughout the interviews commanders and command sergeants major stressed the importance established relationships played in unit readiness for JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Redefining relationships and establishing duty descriptions did not enter into the predeployment equation.

*"My commander's charter to me was to continue to do the things that we had talked about and had been working on prior to departure to Saudi Arabia,"* one command sergeant major stated. Once in the desert, his commander did not change the charter. The sergeant major continued his focus on day to day activities, troop observations, and training assessment. He maintained his dialogue with soldiers and NCOs and functioned as another set of eyes and ears



for his commander. That sergeant major's experience was typical—no fundamental changes to relationships established in peacetime were required.

Across the spectrum of the combat arms, combat support, and combat service support, senior NCOs focused on training. Commanders reported letting the noncommissioned officers handle individual training and squad and crew duties. That allowed commanders to work on the plans for future operations. It freed the officers so they could spend more time on contingency planning and rehearsals.

First Sergeant Jeffrey P. Ross of HHC, 1-8 Cavalry explained that he and his commander developed the following arrangement. *"I would focus my attention on the training program and handle and process everything that was required to do the training. Specifically, we had common task training that we had to do, plus a list of desert specific tasks that were given to us by our higher headquarters. My commander was initially concerned with the logistical assets. He had the property books, accounting for equipment, deciding what was going to be taken. I focused on the training."*


First Sergeant Ross thought that one of the things that worked out great for him was his commander. *"He allowed me to get the NCOs organized in what I thought was the most efficient manner to*

## Leadership and Command on the Battlefield

*get this training done. We were able to come up with our own training plan and the times and places that we were going to conduct the training, and how and when it was to be done."*

From the commander's viewpoint, the active participation of senior NCOs in planning and conducting training went virtually unchallenged. BG George Harmeyer, commander of 1st Brigade 1st Cavalry Division, stated, *"I didn't tell my command sergeant major to change anything. We had come from the NTC, we had trained at home station, we talked everyday about what we needed to do for the brigade. His role was individual training and taking care of soldiers."*


The relationship between the commander and his senior NCO allowed the senior NCO the opportunity to understand the mission priority and commander's intent. The senior NCO became the eyes and ears for the commander. He was key to mission oriented training and motivated soldiers to perform to the highest standards. LTC Johnny Brooks, commander of 4-17 Infantry in the 7ID, commented, *"I had a CSM who was a great soldier and I never had to ask him anything or give him any direction, he always fed me with information he thought I needed to know."* The teamwork and cohesion of the command team became more evident once in the combat zone. The trust and bond between the commander and his senior NCO had become solid and supportive of each other.



## **TRAINING ASSESSMENT**

One of the key missions for NCOs during the predeployment period was training assessment. The first sergeants and sergeants major led the predeployment push to ensure all soldiers were up to speed on basic skills. It was no longer realistic training—it was reality training. As CSM Richard B. Cayton, of the 1st AD during

Operation DESERT STORM, observed, *"When we deployed, and during the predeployment training, my job was sampling training to ensure that the standards that we had already attained were being maintained."* Training assessments and briefs became critical and took on a new sense of urgency and importance. Units paid close attention to NBC training, individual marksmanship, crew drills, and battle drills.



The common threads that allowed command sergeants major and first sergeants to be so effective were their experience and the trust and confidence of their commanders. Command sergeants major and first sergeants developed the ability to assess training and combat readiness during many years of experience with soldiers and their equipment. NCOs had been taught the responsibility of taking care of soldiers which included training on individual skills, accountability of soldier and crew equipment, and maintaining the soldier and his equipment. Senior NCOs found their commanders seeking their advice as to how best manage soldiers and training. Without the experience and schooling, good advice would not have been rendered.

As General Jacob Devers once said, *"When you have the facts and the experience, you can make a decision. If you haven't got the facts and you do have the experience, you can still make a decision and it won't be too bad. But, if you have neither facts nor experience, you're in a terrible fix."* Because commanders gave their command sergeants major and first sergeants the facts and they had the experience, the

### Leadership and Command on the Battlefield

senior NCOs' ability to assess readiness and training requirements was very valuable to mission accomplishment. Senior NCOs dedicated themselves to checking individual, crew, and platoon training as well as barracks closeout procedures, family support issues and requirements, and preparing equipment and support items for shipment by rail, road, air and sea.



### **PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING**

NCO involvement in predeployment planning proved to be invaluable to the success of the combat mission. As noted in previous pamphlets, commanders involved leaders at all levels in the planning process as much as possible, opening the process to suggestion and feedback. That approach allowed NCOs to demonstrate proficiency in the many methods of transporting people and equipment. For instance, senior NCOs of the 2d ACR in Europe planned for and shipped personnel and equipment via road, rail and barge to get soldiers and equipment to port. The 2d ACR commander, COL Don Holder, recalls, *"For success, it is imperative to incorporate the NCOs of the unit into the goal and priority setting process. I received feedback from my NCOs, the keys of which were my first sergeant and platoon sergeants. The command sergeant major looked at the soldiers and first line leader issues."*

Senior staff NCOs often found themselves deeply involved in the planning process. As stated by SGM Usery, 1st Bde, 1st Cav, *"After receiving guidance, the staff NCOs developed differing courses of action and then presented them to the battle captain for preview and*


*presentation to the commander.*" The command sergeant major and first sergeant focused on soldier survival issues as well as welfare issues. The 1st Cavalry Division command sergeant major, CSM Robert Wilson, involved in predeployment, deployment and onward movement of forces once in country, remarked to the III Corps G4 during one planning session that in 1965 the tents promised by a higher headquarters never arrived, and in 1990 the same would be true. As it turned out—he was right. Only through the efforts of the 1st Cav ADC(M) and some now well-to-do bedouins did soldiers get their tents upon arrival. Senior NCOs participated in decisions on uniforms, equipment load plans and soldier support issues. They focused on those things that touched soldiers most directly.



Rehearsals have long been used as a successful tool in the preparation for combat. Through many applications at the Battle Command Training Program, National Training Center, and Joint Readiness Training Center exercises, wargaming has become a science. FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, formally addresses the importance of good rehearsals which include all leaders of the combat teams. Despite the secrecy and joint service actions during Operation JUST CAUSE, CSM Trivett Lloyd, XVIII Airborne Corps, asserted, *"We rehearsed with many units. They just didn't know what they were practicing for."* The XVIII Corps elements constantly rehearsed for contingency operations which allowed for excellent training and planning.

### Leadership and Command on the Battlefield

In Operation DESERT STORM, rehearsals were ongoing during the build-up phase. NCOs made important contributions here, too. Commanders would walk through the plan, movement of units to contact, movement formations, and actions on contact. Command sergeants major and first sergeants were essential players in refueling operations, medical evacuation, prisoner control, and coordination of logistical assets. NCOs found that the best way to understand the commander's intent was through the bottom-up rehearsal process. Bottom-up rehearsal facilitated fine tuning of basic plans and helped in the development of contingency plans such as re-arming, chemical decontamination, and re-supply on the move. Rehearsals ensured that, in the words of the CSM of 1st Infantry Division *"By G-Day, we will be on auto pilot."* Whether in Operation JUST CAUSE or DESERT STORM, rehearsals played a key part in developing confidence in the plan, the leadership, and the equipment the individual soldier had to depend on for survival.



Immediately prior to combat operations command sergeants major and first sergeants turned their energy to unit morale and confidence. During JUST CAUSE, First Sergeant Mattison of the 75th Rangers described his most important role as that of a reassurer and role model of confidence. Soldiers looked to him for reassurance since he had experienced combat before. That trend typified soldier reactions. They turned to NCO combat veterans for assurance. Senior NCOs became the steady rock to lean on for the young officers, NCOs, and soldiers. Soldiers and NCOs in particular sought out command sergeants major and first sergeants for advice and reassurance during pre-combat inspections and walk-throughs.



In the 4th Bn, 66th Armor, CSM Juan Chavez found time prior to deployment to conduct night maneuvers without the aid of light in order to build confidence in soldier and leader capabilities. Some command sergeants major found themselves reinforcing training and confidence building of Bradley dismounts as did SGM Jim Wertman of the 4th Bn, 7th Infantry. He would overwatch the dismount movement to ensure safety and effective movement was executed to standard. Anticipating the great dangers of close combat he focused on avoiding fratricide during the after action reviews.

First sergeants were involved in pre-combat checks and talking with soldiers about MEDEVAC plans and maintenance collection plans. First sergeants ensured their supply sergeants understood their responsibilities and could navigate alone across the desert in Southwest Asia or could run supply across the routes in Panama. Command sergeants major and first sergeants felt that during the preparation phase, they must be with the troops to monitor the pulse of the command. Commanders relied on their perspective to assess the morale and status of troops as well as their will to fight.



### **Leaders' Observations**

My commander allowed me to get the NCOs organized in what I thought was the most efficient manner to get this training done. We were able to come up with our own training plan and the times and the places that we were going to conduct the training and how and when it was to be done.

**1SG Jeffrey P. Ross**  
HHC, 1-8 Cavalry  
DESERT STORM

In the predeployment training, the focus was to ensure that we had our individual skills well mastered so that there would be no doubt in any leader's mind that the soldiers were proficient in the basic skills they needed to survive in combat.

**1SG Walter Lee Cano**  
D Co., 3-32 Armor, 1st Cavalry Div  
DESERT STORM

I understood my commander's intent. We did a lot of rehearsing for what we were going to do with everyone. We constantly had the tanks line up through the wire. We prefabbed obstacles. We had the engineers dig trenches, and we went through and practiced clearing trenches and doing all those kinds of things.

**CSM James E. Lowery**  
5-16 Infantry  
DESERT STORM

Taking care of soldiers meant making sure they had equipment, food, bullets, and that they knew their jobs.

**CSM Harold A. Lockwood**  
20th Engineer Brigade  
DESERT STORM

My first sergeant ensured that we had the resources and time available to train for any contingency mission. He was always out supervising our training, ensuring we trained to standard. He believed and instilled in other NCOs that training to standards during all training was critical to our mission accomplishment. He made us do it right in training, which caused us to do it right in combat.

**MSG Silverio Gonzales**  
3d Bn, 75th Ranger Regiment,  
JUST CAUSE

## Chapter 2

# Combat Operations

*I felt good and comfortable going to war because I knew we had reached a peak of training. I didn't fear anything because I knew we were ready.*

CSM Marvin Alston  
3d Bn, 37th Armor  
DESERT STORM



The pivotal combat role of the command sergeant major and the first sergeant hinges on their inherent ability to lead and influence soldiers. By acting as liaison between commanders and staffs and the senior NCOs in subordinate units, they can fully accomplish the important task of ensuring knowledge of the commander's intent.

The combat role of the senior NCO actually begins prior to the onset of battle. His training and experience are gained over the years in dealings with soldiers, through mentoring, and from formal schooling. He learns perspective as well as technical proficiency.

## COMBAT ROLES

A fundamental question of the combat role of the command sergeant major and first sergeant is—should he be concerned with the operations of the unit? As CSM Jim Wertman, 4th Bn, 7th Infantry during DESERT STORM, told it, *"I saw my primary role as a trouble shooter for the battalion commander so to speak, but with some specific guidelines that we had both sat down and talked about prior to the ground war. One was that POWs belonged to me. The POW plan that was set up in the battalion, how they were to be extracted, how they were to be removed to the brigade collection points, specifically belonged to me. My responsibility was also to assist the logistics piece. With help from the company first sergeants and my headquarters company first sergeant, I developed a plan to refuel in the diamond formation. The third piece was to assist in medical evacuation. I had a five ton that we used for POW collection and we had pre-positioned ambulances. We had some that were forward with the unit, I had some that were with me. Basically, the battalion aid station was broken down into an A and B, so that one could jump and provide medical support for the battalion while another one was setting up."*

That is in consonance with existing doctrine, such as found in FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*. Certainly there are exceptions to the logistical and advisory role of the first sergeant. During the insertion phase of an airborne or air assault operation each soldier assumes the role of a fighter first. The chaotic nature of those operations requires each soldier to fight within the intent of the mission and then assume other roles as the tactical situation allows. First Sergeant Joseph L. Mattison, 3rd Bn, 75th Ranger Regiment recalls his role during the assault on Rio Hato during JUST CAUSE, *"There was sporadic automatic weapons fire as I landed. Still in my parachute harness, I grabbed my LAW from my weapons case. Seeing a vehicle with PDF soldiers engaging our troops, I took them under fire and destroyed them."* Following the seizure of the objective First Sergeant Mattison resumed his role as senior enlisted advisor and looked after casualties and sustainment operations.


Senior staff NCOs also played vital roles in both operations. They were responsible for TOC organization and security. Their biggest challenge came in being able to move their TOCs quickly and

still maintain their staff responsibilities. Staff NCOs were involved in the orders process and often found themselves developing courses of action or plans for consideration of the commander. Soldiers and NCOs in the staff were motivated and knew the critical importance of their work. Staff coordination became the norm once the battle started and the NCOs got really involved in their work. The senior staff NCO, usually the operations sergeant, became the coordinator of the different sections. He had to mold the air defense, engineer, Air Force, and military intelligence sections into the "family" real quick and ensure they worked as a team. Battle tracking of units and equipment became critical.

### COMMAND CONFIDENCE

Unit, mission, and personality determined the role of the command sergeant major and first sergeant. As one Armored Division Commander said about his command sergeant major, *"Frankly, I trusted him to go anywhere and do anything on my behalf."*

Many senior NCOs described their success in terms of their commander's confidence. They argued that success resulted because their commanders trusted them and gave them the authority to go fix things they saw were wrong. They were fully involved in the orders and rehearsal process. Commanders gave them the flexibility



to roam and seek out problems. When asked what guidance they were given by their respective commanders prior to entering close combat operations, most remarked: Do what is right, Take care of the soldiers, Watch the flanks and rear, and Float throughout and keep me informed.

First Sergeant Hastings, C Company, 3rd Bn, 8th Cavalry, 3rd Armored Division during DESERT STORM echoed that sentiment, *"My company commander and I had been together for about a year, and we had a lot of confidence in each other's ability. I roamed the company formation and communicated very well when it was time for logistical operations and resupply operations."*

According to Command Sergeant Major Trivett Lloyd of XVIII Corps, *"I think the keys to success for the senior NCOs in DESERT STORM... were that they were well trained, they had the total and complete confidence of their commanders, and they had the trust of the soldiers they were in charge of leading and maintaining. I would also have to say that education played a great part in that. We knew the intent, the commander's intent, and we were given the liberty to accomplish the mission in the best way we knew how to do it. For the first time, I think in all my years of soldiering, I experienced and witnessed with my own two eyes, commanders letting sergeants major do things that we'd never done before. For example, moving combat trains—the sergeant major would just take charge and do that. Move log bases, we've never been able to do that before. Usually, you always had the battalion executive officer or the battalion S4 back there doing that. The sergeants major and the senior NCOs demonstrated their ability time and time again in the desert. Hey—we can do the job and the officers knew that and they let us do it. I think that to sum it up in a nutshell, officers gave us a more free hand to do our job in the desert than I've ever seen anywhere else I've been."*

Clearly commanders needed to broaden the scope of their NCOs as a matter of necessity. They did so with confidence. NCOs did not disappoint their commanders.

### COMBAT POSITION

Most of the senior NCOs in the combat arms tried to stay in touch with their commanders, with the TAC CP, or stay close to the front. In reality, they continually moved back and forth, checking on

logistics, checking on how the rear trains were coming. Command sergeants major and first sergeants tried to be the honest broker of how things were really going. Noncommissioned officers and young officers talked openly with the command sergeant major who had complete liberty to move around the battlefield and report to his commander what he found. CSMs enabled commanders to assess the state of their command continually and thus facilitated a significant part of the continuous operation.

CSM Ron Parrett, 2d Bde, 1st Cavalry Division, reflected on his first combat experience as a command sergeant major, *"That first day I had covered all the way from the field trains to the TOC, and all the way to the front where the casualties were being brought back in. I gave the commander an evaluation on how everybody was functioning that day from the MEDEVACs in the rear to the guys in the TOC. That was what the commander wanted me to do the first days of our berm buster, was to be at every level of the battlefield and give him a report on how everything was functioning."*


If the senior NCOs were attuned to the commander's intent, understood what he really wanted to do, and had a good support channel working, that freed the commander to focus on the battle.



### *Leadership and Command on the Battlefield*

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Senior NCOs declared that they concerned themselves with the evacuation of casualties, POWs, and maintenance. Because the sergeant major was a soldier, and started off as a soldier, he was closely attuned to a soldier's needs and wants. As the senior enlisted advisor, whether it was the first sergeant or the command sergeant major, the most important thing that the senior NCO could do for the



commander was know the soldiers, have the intestinal fortitude to be always honest with the commander, and let the commander make the decision. Effective NCOs enable commanders to **command!**

During DESERT STORM senior NCOs were able to do more than merely check the pulse of their units. Upon discovering or hearing of a problem, most went to the problem, fixed it, and moved on. In JUST CAUSE, the same was true with the exception of the light force command sergeant major who was forward in the fight and looked to such things as aviation support, palletization of resupply, and medical evacuation. First sergeants took care of maintenance, logistics package, POWs and medical evacuation while in the fight and were thought of as the senior movers and shakers of logistics.



## **Leaders' Observations**

I couldn't afford to get nervous. I couldn't get tired. I couldn't get scared. I couldn't want to go home. I couldn't give up. I knew it would have an effect on my soldiers, so I disciplined myself to not show these things. If my morale went down, their morale would go down. I had a big impact, so I had to maintain things.

**CSM Edward S. Usery**  
1st Bde, 1st Cavalry Division  
DESERT STORM

Once we got out in the desert, I became my commander's right arm.

**CSM Stuart Acock**  
51st Bn, 93d Signal Bde  
DESERT STORM

It was my responsibility to make sure that the soldiers and NCOs did the kinds of things that they were supposed to do—to ensure that the noncommissioned officers were trained and the soldiers were focused and trained on doing the things pertaining to the mission.

**CSM Jimmy G. Bowles**  
197th Infantry Bde  
DESERT STORM

Sergeants get committed to soldiers. When you go to war, you want to go to war with trained soldiers. When you go to war with trained soldiers and committed sergeants, you come back with those with whom you left.

**CSM Harold A. Lockwood**  
20th Engineer Brigade  
DESERT STORM

My commander placed me with the weakest platoon to assist them initially in their first battle, then he wanted me to ensure the troops were kept informed as to what was going down and enforce combat discipline and battle techniques.


**MSG Daniel Oltesvig**  
4th Bn, 325 Infantry  
JUST CAUSE

## Chapter 3

# Post Combat Operations

*The way we quickly became the humanitarian supporters was a mark of who we are and what we stand for as American soldiers. Our sense of discipline, sense of values, sense of being a soldier.*

LTG Frederick M. Franks, Jr.  
Cdr, VII Corps  
DESERT STORM





During Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, soldiers and their leaders found themselves facing a situation not faced in many years—that of being victorious in battle and then having to care for and protect the refugees caused by conflict. Soldiers and their leaders were challenged to change their focus from destruction to protection and humanitarian relief as well as simultaneous withdrawal from the area of operations and return of forces to homestation. They were complex, leadership sensitive, soldier intensive operations.

### **MISSION ADJUSTMENT**

As operations during JUST CAUSE developed, units became responsible for running major cities and towns. That follow-on mission required identification of what was important in terms of rebuilding local infrastructures, reestablishing law and order, and dedicating resources to unfamiliar tasks. Those unfamiliar tasks included food distribution and medical treatment of the local population, law enforcement, garbage collection, and traffic control.


Command sergeants major and first sergeants reported having to coordinate with personnel in civil affairs units, explosive ordnance detachments, and military police companies with which they






had not trained. Units reacted with their ingrained ethical values as well as discipline and execution to standard which allowed them to succeed in an orderly manner.

A first sergeant recalled that his toughest challenge was fixing priorities for his vehicle, which was a two and a half ton truck. Support the unit? Or support the garbage collection in the local area until the civilians could gain control? He said he did both with a smile. A command sergeant major in JUST CAUSE said that in coordination with civil affairs personnel, he began using the locals to help in food and water distribution which allowed more of his soldiers to focus on security—theirs and the local populace.






### **SUSTAINMENT**

While providing humanitarian support was a challenge to senior NCOs and their soldiers, other challenges were continual—prepare for future missions or redeployment back to home station.

As CSM Richard Cayton, 1AD, DESERT STORM, reflected, *"It was very obvious, very quickly that the most important thing we could do to continue the success and the momentum, even though it was not a momentum of battle, but a momentum of mental awareness, was to keep people informed. The focus went back to one of the cornerstones. It went back to maintaining discipline."* That translated to taking care of soldiers.

The focus became get back to normal, clean equipment, and maintain all personal gear and unit equipment. Command sergeants major and first sergeants were busy all over the area establishing PX facilities, latrine and shower facilities, and taking care of the mountains of trash. Command sergeants major got back to the routine of daily unit inspections as a way to maintain discipline and standards.

As CSM Charles Gee, 1-32 Armor, related, *"The soldiers took pride because the NCOs forced them and made them do the standards. They took pride in their uniforms and weapons. We did monthly ceremonies, before the war and even after, we did monthly payday ceremonies. We kept working with the training. We trained for six days and had a day of rest. Sunday was a day of rest. We let the soldiers run around in their PT clothes and that was a big morale factor. The noncommissioned officers didn't let down, they kept their training."*



## **Leaders' Observations**

We conducted some of our best training in Saudi Arabia. There were no distractors, we didn't have the paperwork that is present in garrison. Our whole focus was training—ensuring that our soldiers were trained, our equipment was maintained. There was nothing of higher priority.

**1SG Walter Lee Cano**  
D Co., 3-32 Armor, 1st Cavalry Div  
**DESERT STORM**

If you have a well laid plan, you can make 85 percent of it work. We had a pretty good plan, and when it actually happened, we knew what to do.

**1SG Dennis L. DeMasters**  
4-32 Armor, 3rd Armored Div  
**DESERT STORM**

The sergeant major and first sergeant must be out leading from the front, whether that's a five mile run, an eight mile run, or a twenty-five mile road march. If they are, they won't have any problems with subordinate soldiers or noncommissioned officers knowing what the standard is and who is going to enforce that standard.

**CSM Steven R. Slocum**  
2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Div  
**DESERT STORM**

Senior NCO experience and schooling allowed them to focus their efforts at critical points prior to and during the battles. Most became a cheerleader and reassurer to the soldiers that everything was going well and they, the soldiers, were doing great.

**MSG Silverio Gonzales**  
3d Bn, 75th Ranger Regiment  
**JUST CAUSE**

We executed our missions exactly as we had trained, and we expected the unexpected. When the unexpected happened, we fixed it and got on with business.

**MSG Dennis H. Gilmore**  
112th Signal Battalion  
**JUST CAUSE**

## Chapter 4

# Sustaining Success

*The senior NCOs had the latitude to make judgments and nobody said, "Why did you do this?" or "That was dumb", or anything like that. Everybody had trust and confidence in the senior NCOs and let them do their job.*




The command sergeant major and first sergeant habitually assist their commander by maintaining high standards of conduct and discipline. Those senior NCOs are responsible for enforcing the standards through proper leadership as they go about their daily business. Commanders and senior NCOs involved in both JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM consistently remembered that disciplined soldiers and units ensured success in combat operations. Discipline, training to standard, and leader development were the winning edge. The challenge for the future is to sustain that success and winning edge.




## **DISCIPLINE STANDARDS**

To sustain disciplined proficiency throughout the organization, senior NCOs must teach, coach, mentor and train to standard. Anything less is a disservice to the soldiers and the organization.


In battle, discipline is of supreme importance. Most soldiers are afraid in battle. Discipline produces the courage to overcome that fear. Discipline in a soldier activates a sense of duty and obligation to the unit and fellow soldiers. When soldiers habitually follow orders and battle drills, training will pay off with discipline.





A battalion command sergeant major during Operation DESERT STORM remarked, *"Discipline and standards were there from day one, and as long as we had discipline and NCOs enforcing standards and setting the example we didn't have a problem. We didn't have one single soldier get involved in any incident while we were up in Iraq, we didn't have one single one that got hurt from going out driving the Tapline, and that was strictly because of the discipline that the first sergeants enforced in the company. I had four out of the five that were real tough disciplinarians."*

Discipline and standards were enforced by senior NCOs as they went through their organizations in training on ranges, hygiene in the unit area, or monitoring a tactical movement. The senior NCOs were out teaching soldiers and junior NCOs to execute the mission to standard. Interviewees agreed that the battalion command sergeant major should monitor two levels down—look at the platoon sergeant and see how he is training his soldiers, enforcing standards, keeping his soldiers fed with information and how they are maintaining themselves and equipment. Through that process success can be sustained. The basics of leadership were critically



important: self-respect, efficiency, motivation, loyalty, combat readiness, morale, esprit de corps, and understanding the commander's intent.

Soldiers are proud to be part of a well trained and disciplined organization. Discipline leads the soldier to develop trust and confidence in his leadership. The challenge is for the senior NCOs to enforce those unit standards and ensure the soldiers understand the unit goals. Discipline within an organization will become a key ingredient for success. Successful training to standard will foster good discipline. Proper training will also foster pride and confidence in the individual. When that pride and confidence have been developed to the point that obedience becomes habit and response becomes natural and willing, the unit has become a combat ready organization.

### **TRAINING**

The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army has stated that training is the glue that holds the Army together. Training was the key that ensured success in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Proper training developed combat ready units by molding skilled individuals into teams and combining teams into effective platoons, companies and task forces. With FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, senior NCOs have direct guidance to describe their duties and responsibilities within the training arena.

NCOs are charged with the responsibility of training soldiers. Generally, the NCO is responsible for teaching marksmanship, gunnery, NBC, communication, and maintenance training which improve the survival skills of the soldier and his unit. Senior NCOs must ensure that training is being conducted to standard. They must ensure that the individual tasks are tied to the collective and support the unit's mission essential task list.

Training should build confidence in soldier skills and abilities as well as build confidence in leaders and equipment. NCOs must challenge the soldier, crew, and platoon. NCOs must train to standard and never accept less.

Many command sergeants major and first sergeants observed that one reason they felt comfortable in overseeing pre-combat training was the way training had been decentralized, especially in the European environment. Many said the way they executed training in preparation for combat was no different than they had at homestation. CSM Steven Slocum, 2d Bde, 82d Airborne Division, related, *"Within 18 hours of notification, we arrived in theater. We took two days to three days for the rest to close. We had trained for over the past year, concentrating on live fire, concentrating on standards, all came into play upon our arrival into Saudi Arabia."*

Most senior NCOs credited their ability to be successful with rotations through the Combat Training Centers, such as JRTC and NTC. That was where they learned how to perform as a command



### Leadership and Command on the Battlefield

team, how to train soldiers, and execute missions to standard. Many said the deployment to Southwest Asia was similar to the preparation and deployment for the National Training Center. It was the consensus that the CTCs sharpened leadership and training skills which led to a highly trained combat unit.

As MG William Carter, ADC(M) of 1st Infantry Division during DESERT STORM stated, *"NCOs are willing to do almost anything. All they want to know is what's the standard, and then if you, the commander, are going to cause me to hold the soldiers accountable to that standard, are you going to back me up because some of them are not, and I'm going to need your help, commander, to get them to standard or out of the Army."*

Interviewees agreed that command sergeants major and first sergeants should hold noncommissioned officers accountable and give them the responsibility to be accountable. Sergeants charged with training soldiers should be allowed the latitude to make mistakes in training so they don't make those mistakes in combat.


In summary, the process described in FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, worked. Senior NCOs believed in the METL process and trained to the METL critical tasks. That process coupled with the participation in CTC exercises gave them the opportunity to hone their skills and perform in a combat environment.

### **LEADER DEVELOPMENT**

Senior NCOs related that the NCO education system and leader development program built the strong NCO Corps which performed in JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. The development of NCOs was cumulative and sequential as a result of their military schooling, operational assignments, and self-development. Senior NCOs must continue to monitor and guide the development of junior NCOs, to train them to perform critical tasks by acquiring the proper skill, knowledge and attitudes. Senior NCOs can accomplish this by taking advantage of opportunities to send their subordinate leaders to all appropriate technical, developmental, skill qualification, and confidence building courses available.

Interviewees maintained that operational assignments were fundamental to growing leaders who had valuable experience from being "in the trenches." It was agreed that senior NCOs must be out

around soldiers and junior NCOs teaching, coaching, and mentoring. A platoon sergeant remarked on his command sergeant major, *"I think he was the enforcer. I don't know if that is the right word for it, but I saw our sergeant major check everything. He would be up every day looking at our security, at our perimeter. He would come around to look at the training that we were doing, to see that the standards were being maintained. I saw him numerous times in our operations center making sure that people were doing what they were supposed to. By doing that, he kept the battalion commander up on what was going on and it gave him a good feeling that those sergeants were out there doing their jobs."*



Many of the command sergeants major and first sergeants voiced strong approval for the leader development programs. A solid NCO educational system runs from PLDC to the Sergeants Major Academy—a system that is producing technically competent and tactically proficient leaders. CSM Steven Slocum, 2d Bde, 82d Airborne Division during DESERT STORM, summed leader development, *"The noncommissioned officer education system is turning out and training superb noncommissioned officers. We are setting high standards at these institutions, weeding out those that are not professional, not dedicated or cannot meet the standards. That, coupled with an active training program brings the best out of our noncommissioned officers."*

As the battle draws down and forces become closely aligned and engaged, discipline plays a critical role in stopping friendly fire incidents or violations of land warfare principles.

### **Leaders' Observations**

I think my leaders were successful because of the confidence they had in their men and themselves and the training they received, and also the equipment they were using.

**CSM Ron Parrett**  
2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Div  
DESERT STORM

The noncommissioned officer corps is getting smarter and better educated across the Army. Education is important, physical fitness is also important, as is leading from the front.

**CSM Steven R. Slocum**  
2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Div  
DESERT STORM

I think the strength of the noncommissioned officer corps comes from their genuine concern for the soldiers. When I was a drill sergeant, a battalion commander told me that I didn't have to love the soldiers, but I had to care about them. And he was right. Good NCOs genuinely care about their soldiers. They constantly go to bat for them and make sure their needs are met.

**SGM Tommy Johnson**  
HHC, XVIII Corps  
DESERT STORM

A combination of NCOES and training in the combat training centers had developed a competence, not only in the NCO leaders but in the officer leaders as well, that when sergeant first class somebody says something, we might need to listen to that, that might be a good idea.

**CSM Thomas J. Edmondson**  
210 Field Artillery Brigade  
DESERT STORM

Our senior NCOs used great initiative and judgment based on years of experience and training to train soldiers to the highest standards. We truly trained as we fought, and the soldiers were proud of their support in JUST CAUSE.

**MSG Dennis H. Gilmore**  
112th Signal Battalion  
JUST CAUSE

## Summary

The United States Army functions as well as its lowest common denominator—the soldier. Soldiers train and soldiers fight under the supervisory guidance and leadership of the noncommissioned officer corps. This group of men and women perform a variety of roles in their day-to-day jobs—they are mothers and fathers, teachers and trainers, guidance counselors, and priests. Whatever their major occupational position, they fill all the imaginable holes between the commander and the soldier.

The senior noncommissioned officers of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM moved among the ranks performing tasks of preparation and adjustment to mission—jobs often unguided by doctrine yet critical to the functioning of the massing and mobilization of the forces called to battle. Once engaged, NCOs were leaders and fighters—effective translators for the commander.

In the jungles of Panama and the deserts of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, NCOs provided the overwatch—continually training, checking standards, enforcing discipline, minding the bits and pieces that, when called, emerge as the whole of the company, the battalion, the brigade. The experiences of this recent past only reinforce the needs of tomorrow—one among them a strong NCO corps dedicated to the twin pillars of leadership and service.



## Appendixes

**Appendix A—Bullet Comments of Trends**

**Appendix B—Survey Questions**

**Appendix C—Leader Acknowledgment**

## Appendix A

### **Bullet Comments of Trends**

- **Command sergeants major trained as long and as hard as they could prior to deployment. They attended all briefings on contingency planning.**
- **The charge given many command sergeants major was to obtain as much information as possible and disseminate it.**
- **The senior NCOs' involvement was an essential key to the success of the units and the training management cycle. NCOs were knowledgeable of the systems of reporting and keeping track of who could do what and what type of training.**
- **Senior NCOs' responsibilities during the deployment phase was to ensure their soldiers were prepared for deployment and were prepared for battle. Command sergeants major focused their attention on personnel shortages, equipment, and movement to port or airport.**
- **Command sergeants major stood out by the fact that they managed a lot of areas during a short time period.**

*Leadership and Command on the Battlefield*

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- Senior staff NCOs supported the staff during combat operations—running shifts, keeping soldiers informed, and writing AARs for specific actions—constantly training and learning.

- Command sergeants major generally had their own vehicle out of the HHC of the unit.

- Command sergeants major observed soldier welfare and played a significant role in the logistics area.

- The primary role of the first sergeant in combat was to keep up with his platoons and his unit.

- The NCOs were distinguished by their attitude, mission dedication, and desire to win in combat.

## **Appendix B**

# **Survey Questions**

**Questions for Division, Brigade, and Battalion Commanders and Command Sergeants Major on the Role of the Senior NCO during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.**

### **ALERT AND PREPARATION FOR COMBAT**

1. Did your organization have its full complement of senior NCOs to include staff and special staff? Did this affect your unit preparedness for rapid deployment?

2. What role did your CSM/SGM play in predeployment training and training assessment? Did senior staff NCOs train their sections allowing officers to plan future operations?

3. What role did your CSM/SGM play in contingency planning? Did they attend key orders briefs/briefbacks?

4. What was your charge to the CSM/SGM during this phase?

5. Were your senior NCOs vocal about their abilities and did they step forward with help and advice? What key areas did they excel in and which areas needed additional work or emphasis?

6. Did your senior NCOs understand the commander's intent? How was this conveyed to them?

7. Do you think senior NCO involvement in the training management cycle helped in their and your organizations preparedness?

8. Did your unit have the opportunity to rehearse battle drills? Were your key NCOs at rehearsals and did they participate in the AAR process?

### *Leadership and Command on the Battlefield*

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9. What were senior NCO responsibilities during the deployment phase? Were these responsibilities consistent with other deployments such as those to NTC, CTC or large scale joint exercises? Where did the CSM focus his attention?

10. What made your CSM/SGM stand out prior to entering into combat operations? Did he/she have a feel for troop morale and confidence?

### **COMBAT OPERATIONS**

11. What guidance did you give your CSM as to where you wanted him on the battlefield? What factors influenced your decision? Did he/she carry forward your intent?

12. Did your senior staff NCOs support the staff well during combat operations? What keys to their success did you observe? Did they keep their soldiers well informed?

13. Were senior NCOs working on your battle staffs competent in their role as battle staff NCOs? Were battle staff NCO duties and responsibilities outlined in the TACSOP?

14. What type of vehicle and communications did the CSM have to accomplish your guidance? Was this the same vehicle he/she used prior to combat operations?

15. How did your CSM/senior NCO assess and provide advice on soldier welfare issues? How did he work the NCO support channel?

16. Did your CSM play a principal role in logistics management? If so, what was his/her impact?

17. What was the primary role of the 1SG in combat operations? What were two secondary roles?

18. How often did you communicate directly with your CSM during combat operations (daily, every other day, etc.)?

19. What key factors in using senior NCOs did you identify during or after combat operations? Is there a difference between training/peacetime environment and combat operations when it comes to CSM/SGM responsibilities?

### **POST CONFLICT OPERATIONS**

20. How did you utilize your CSM during post conflict, humanitarian operations? Did he/she understand civil-military operations and its impact on soldiers as well as civilians?

21. Did the NCO support channel function in support of your intent upon cessation of hostilities? What were some of the key points you observed where NCOs made this phase of the operation a success?

### **TIPS FOR SUCCESS**

22. What made your NCOs successful?

23. What shortfalls did your senior NCOs display and what can be done to correct those shortfalls?

24. Is there anything you wish to address that is not covered in this survey to help strengthen NCO performance or development?

## Appendix C

# Leader Acknowledgment

**GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr.,** Commanded VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**GEN Gary E. Luck,** Commanded XVIII Corps during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**LTG James H. Johnson, Jr.,** Commanded 82d Airborne Division during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**MG William G. Carter III,** Assistant Division Commander(M), 1st Infantry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**MG Paul E. Funk,** Commanded 3rd Armored Division during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**BG George H. Harmeyer,** Commanded 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**BG Randolph W. House,** Commanded 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**COL Leonard D. Holder, Jr.,** Commanded 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment under VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**LTC John K. Anderson,** Commanded 1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**LTC Johnny Brooks,** Commanded 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry (Light) during Operation JUST CAUSE

*Leadership and Command on the Battlefield*

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**LTC Gary Bushoure**, Commanded 121st Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**LTC James B. Gunlicks**, Division G3, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**LTC James W. Reed**, Commanded 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) during Operation JUST CAUSE

**LTC Robert Wilson**, Commanded 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CPT Daniel B. Allyn**, Commanded Company C, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment during Operation JUST CAUSE

**CSM Stuart Acock**, served as CSM, 51st Signal Battalion, 93rd Signal Brigade during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Marvin Alston**, served as CSM, 3rd Battalion, 37th Armor, 1st Infantry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Thurman Beaver**, served as CSM, 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry, 7th Infantry Division (Light) during Operation JUST CAUSE

**CSM Dennis R. Bowers**, served as CSM, 7th Engineer Brigade, VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Jimmy G. Bowles**, served as CSM, 197th Infantry Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mech) during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Richard B. Cayton**, served as CSM, 1st Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Juan A. Chavez**, served as CSM, 4th Battalion, 66th Armor, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, attached to 1st Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM



**CSM Thomas J. Edmondson**, served as CSM, 210th Field Artillery Brigade, VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Charles M. Gee**, served as CSM, 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Trivett (Tim) Lloyd**, served as CSM, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Harold A. Lockwood**, served as CSM, 20th Engineer Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM James E. Lowery**, served as CSM, 5th Battalion, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Albert Mallet**, served as CSM, DISCOM, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Robert McElroy**, served as CSM, 7th Transportation Battalion, 7th Support Group, 1st COSCOM, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Ron Parrett**, served as CSM, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Steven R. Slocum**, served as CSM, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Bruce Smolen**, served as CSM, 544th Corps Support Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division during Operation DESERT STORM

**CSM Ronnie Strahan**, served as CSM, Army Special Operations Command during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

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**CSM Edward S. Usery**, served as S3 Sergeant Major, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**CSM Robert E. Wilson**, served as CSM, 1st Cavalry Division during Operation DESERT SHIELD and as VII Corps CSM during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**SGM Tommy Johnson**, served as G3 Sergeant Major, XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**SGM Jeffrey P. Ross**, served as 1SG, HHC, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**SGM James R. Wertman**, served as CSM, 4th Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, attached to 1st Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**MSG Dennis H. Gilmore**, served as Platoon Sergeant, 112th Signal Battalion, supporting 7th Special Forces and 96th Civil Affairs during Operation JUST CAUSE

**MSG Silverio Gonzales**, served as Tactical Communications Chief, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment during Operation JUST CAUSE

**MSG Kenneth D. Jones**, served as 1SG, A Company, 312 MI Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division during Operation DESERT STORM

**MSG Joseph S. Theriot**, served as Platoon Sergeant in B Company, 1-35 Armor, 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division during Operation DESERT STORM

**1SG Walter L. Cano**, served as 1SG, Company D, 3rd Battalion, 32d Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**1SG Rick A. Clark**, served in DISCOM, 3rd Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**1SG Craig A. Clemmings**, served as 1SG, Headquarters Company, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division during Operation DESERT STORM

**1SG Dennis L. DeMasters**, served as Scout Platoon Sergeant, 4th Battalion, 32d Armor, 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**1SG Charles F. Fuss**, served as Platoon Sergeant, 3rd Battalion, 32d Armor, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**1SG Timothy W. Hastings**, served as 1SG, Company C, 3rd Squadron, 8th Cavalry, 3rd Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**1SG Joseph L. Mattison**, served as 1SG, Company A, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment during Operation JUST CAUSE

**1SG Daniel Oltesvig**, served as First Sergeant, C Company, 4th Battalion, 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division during Operation JUST CAUSE

**SFC Larry Adams**, served as Platoon Sergeant with the Light Infantry Troop, 3rd Squadron, 2d ACR during Operation DESERT STORM

**SFC Michael B. Curry**, served as Platoon Sergeant with B Company, 4th Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 3rd Armored Division during Operation DESERT STORM

**SFC Henry L. Davis**, served as Motor Sergeant, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

**SFC Bill Fry**, served as Platoon Sergeant with B Company, 2d Battalion, 70th Armor during Operation DESERT STORM

**SFC David A. T. Lane**, served as Platoon Sergeant, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 1st Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

*Leadership and Command on the Battlefield*

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**SFC Marvin Miller**, served as Platoon Sergeant in B Company, 4th Battalion, 70th Armor, 1st Armored Division during Operation DESERT STORM

**SFC John R. Nistler**, served as Platoon Sergeant, Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

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